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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
considered as only partially breached. And when there is only a
partial breach of the covenant, it would seem that the entire consid-
eration money may not be recovered but the vendee may only recover
pro tanto.48  Thus where grantors covenanted that they were seised
of an absolute estate of inheritance in fee simple in the premises,
while they only possessed a life estate, the covenant was held to be
partially breached and the grantee could only recover a proportional
part of the consideration, the value of such life estate being deducted
as his title to that extent was good.49 In such actions to recover for
the partial breach of the covenant, the usual measure of damages
allowed is such part of the original price as bears the same ratio to
the whole consideration that the value of the land to which title has
failed bears to the value of the whole premises. 50 The same general
principles concerning interest, costs, improvements, etc., mentioned
above and which govern the final recovery when there is a total
breach, apply likewise in these actions.
EDWARD T. REILLY.
THE SELF-INCRIMINATION CLAUSE-COMMENT ON THE ACCUSED'S
FAILURE TO TESTIFY-PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO THE
CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE.
At a meeting held September 12, 1935, the Judicial Council of
the State of New York publicly announced through its chairman,
Chief Justice Crane, the drafting of a bill to be submitted to the next
session of the state legislature, amending the New York Code of
Criminal Procedure so as to permit comment by the prosecuting at-
torney on the failure of the defendant in a criminal trial to testify
in his own behalf.' A similar bill, sponsored by the Attorney-General,
was introduced to the recent session of the New York legislature
"Morris v. Phelps, 5 Johns. 49 (N. Y. 1809).
"Tanner v. Livingston, 12 Wend. 83 (N. Y. 1834).
'Morris v. Phelps, 5 Johns. 49 (N. Y. 1809); Guthrie v. Pugsley, 12
Johns. 126 (N. Y. 1815) ; Kane v. Sanger, 14 Johns. 89 (N. Y. 1816) ; Wager
v. Schuyler, 1 Wend. 553 (N. Y. 1828); Tanner v. Livingston, 12 Wend. 83
(N. Y. 1834) ; Giles v. Dugro, 1 Duer 331 (N. Y. 1852) ; Furniss v. Ferguson,
15 N. Y. 443 (1857); Hunt v. Raplee, 44 Hun 149 (N. Y. 1887); Grantier v.
Austin, 66 Hun 157 (N. Y. 1892) ; Brown v. Allen, 73 Hun 291 (N. Y. 1893) ;
Sweet v. Howell, 96 App. Div. 45, 89 N. Y. Supp. 21 (3d Dept. 1904) ; Roak
v. Sullivan, 96 Misc. 429, 125 N. Y. Supp. 835 (1910) ; Hilliker v. Rueger, 228
N. Y. 11, 126 N. E. 266 (1920).
IN. Y. L. J., Sept. 17, 1935. See also REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMrrE
ON THE REvIsION OF THE N. Y. CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, tentative draft
of chapter on Preliminary Examination, tit. III, c. 3, §198, in N. Y. L. J.,
Sept. 23, 1935.
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and rejected by both houses.2  Like resolutions were voted by the
American Bar Association and the American Law Institute in 1931. 3
Several of the states have considered proposals to change the existing
rule of law to allow the jury to draw inferences from the defendant's
refusal to offer testimony refuting the charges brought against him
or to permit the court or prosecution to comment on that fact.
4
Nevertheless the law in forty-two of the states still protects the ac-
cused from being compelled to testify against himself, and prevents
comments upon, or inferences from, his refusal to take the witness
stand in his own trial.
The efforts made to change the rules of judicial procedure to
meet the requirements of modern conditions, by making the defen-
dant's silence in a criminal action the proper subject of comment by
the prosecuting attorney, have raised serious constitutional questions
as well as doubts as to the propriety of changing a principle of law
that has existed in New York since 1869 and earlier in some of the
other states.
The maxim Nerno tenetur prodere seipsum (No one is bound to
accuse himself) is of doubtful origin.6  However, it was apparently
first introduced to the common law by Lord Coke at the beginning
of the seventeenth century in his campaign to curtail the power of
the Court of High Commission.7 From the earliest days, in both
the ecclesiastical and secular courts, evidence secured by admissions
extracted from the accused under extreme coercion and torture, was
competent to secure his conviction. -Charges requisite to allow tor-
'Senate Bill No. 652, Int. 611, died in Committee. Assembly Bill No.
1467, Int. 920, died in Committee. (Both bills provided for comment by court
and district attorney.)
' "That by law it should be permitted to the prosecution to comment to
the jury on the fact that a defendant did not take the stand as a witness; and
to the jury to draw reasonable inferences." 56 REPORTS OF AM. BAR Ass'N
137, 152; "The judge, the prosecuting attorney and counsel for the defense
may comment upon the fact that the defendant did not testify." 9 PRoc. Am.
LAW INsT. 218.
'See Reeder, Comment on the Accused's Failure to Testify (1931) 31
MIcH. L. REv. 40.
'The six non-conformist states are: Georgia, where the accused is still
not a competent witness; Iowa, where the statute preventing comment was
repealed; New Jersey, where the constitution contains no self-incrimination
clause and judicial decisions have allowed comment, State v. Zdanawicz, 69
N. J. L. 619, 55 Atl. 743 (1903); Parker v. State, 61 N. J. L. 308, 39 Atl.
651 (1898); State v. Kisik, 99 N. J. L. 385, 125 At. 239 (1924); Nevada,
where the court may comment only when the defendant requests instruction
as to his right to refrain from testifying; Ohio, whereby constitutional amend-
ment to art. I, §10 (Sept. 3, 1912) comment is permitted; and South Dakota,
where, by statute enacted in 1927, defendant's silence is made the proper
subject of comment by the prosecuting attorney. S. D. STATS. 1927, c. 93,
p. 116.
'Corwin, The Supreme Court's Construction of the Self-Incrhin mtion
Clause (1930) 29 MICH. L. REV. 3.
4 WIGM ORE, EVIDENCE (2d ed. 1923) §2250; 2 CHAmBERLAYNE, EVIDENCE,
§1543 et seq.
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ture could be made on the basis of mere rumor substantiated by two
witnesses. To protect persons accused of crime from over-zealous
prosecutors, the principle that no person may be compelled to testify
against himself, was enlarged to render the defendant an incompe-
tent witness and to make his testimony inadmissible against himself.
Incorporated into the common law, this doctrine was applied
throughout the American colonies. Following independence the rule
of law was adopted in the constitution of every state in the Union,
except Iowa and New Jersey, though by language restricted to the
prohibition upon self-incrimination.8 By the common law the de-
fendant continued to be incompetent as a witness in the state and
federal courts until a wave of legislation, following a statute in Maine
in 1864, removed the disability of the defendant as a witness in the
federal jurisdiction and in every state but GeorgiaY The early stat-
utes in Maine, California,'0 and South Carolina 11 allowed the accused
to testify at his own request but made no mention of the right by
court or prosecution to comment on his failure to so request. The
Maine courts allowed such comments to be made and inferences to
be drawn under the statute 12 causing the legislature, in 1879, to pro-
vide that the defendant's silence should not be taken as evidence of
his guilt.'3 In California the Supreme Court decided that the state
constitution, by the clause protecting the accused from being com-
pelled to testify, forbade comment by the trial court on his refusal
to testify. 14 A later statute expressly provided that failure to testify
should not prejudice the accused.' 5 The Supreme Court of South
Carolina declared that the statute, though it did not in express terms
say no presumption should arise from defendant's failure to testify,
nevertheless forbade such presumption.' 6  Most of the other states
followed the statute enacted in Massachusetts in 1866, which allowed
the defendant to testify if he so desired but provided that no pre-
sumption should arise from his failure to speak.17 The Federal
Government accepted the reform by the Act of Congress in 1878,
which declared that the accused in the federal courts "shall at his
own request, but not otherwise, be a competent witness. And his
'WIGMORE, Op. cit. §2252, n. 1.
'THAYER, EVIDENCE (2d ed.) 1117; Me. Laws of 1864, c. 280, p. 214; Ga.
Laws of 1866, p. 138.
10 Stats. of Cal. (1865-6) c. 644, p. 865.
Stats. of S. C. (1866) Act. 4780, §2; 13 S. C. STATS. 366.
State v. Bartlett, 55 Me. 200 (1867) ; State v. Cleaves, 59 Me. 298 (1871).
See State v. Banks, 78 Me. 490, 7 Atl. 269 (1886) ; State v. Landry, 85
Me. 95, 26 Atl. 998 (1892).
" People v. Tyler, 36 Cal. 522 (1869).
'Reeder, op. cit. supra note 4; see People v. Sanders, 114 Cal. 216, 46
Pac. 153 (1896).
"State v. Howard, 35 S. C. 197, 14 S. E. 481 (1891).
17 MAss. ACTS AND RESOLVES, c. 260, p. 245 (1866).
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failure to make such request shall not create any presumption against
him." 18
The New York law, passed in 1869,19 while making the accused
a competent witness, also protected him from presumptions likely to
arise if he availed himself of his constitutional privilege not to testify.
The trend away from the rigidity of the common law rule was rec-
ognized and criticized by the Court of Appeals in the case of Ruloff
v. People 20 in 1871, when it said:
"The act may be regarded as of doubtful propriety, and many
regard it as unwise, and as subjecting a person on trial to a
severe, if not cruel, test. If sworn, his testimony will be
treated as of but little value, will be subjected to those tests
which detract from the weight of evidence given under
peculiar inducements to pervert the truth when the truth would
be unfavorable, and he will, under the law as now understood
and interpreted, be subjected to the cross-examination of the
prosecuting officer, and made to testify to any and all matters
relevant to the issue, or his own credibility and character, and
under pretence of impeaching him as a witness, all the inci-
dents of his life brought to bear with great force against him-
self. He will be examined under the embarrassments inci-
dent to his position, depriving him of his self-possession and
necessarily greatly interfering with nis capacity to do himself
and the truth justice, if he is really desirous to speak the
truth. These embarrassments will more seriously affect the
innocent than the guilty and hardened in crime. Discreet
counsel will hesitate before advising a client charged with high
crimes to be a witness against himself, under all the disad-
vantages surrounding him. If, with this statute in force, the
fact that he is not sworn can be used against him, aid suspi-
cion be made to assume the form and have the force of evi-
dence, and circumstances, however slightly tending to prove
his guilt, be made conclusive evidence of the fact, then the
individual is morally coerced, although not actually compelled
to be a witness against himself. The constitution, which pro-
tects a party accused of crime from being a witness against
himself, will be practically abrogated. (Italics supplied.)
1820 STAT. 30, 28 U. S. C. A. §632 (1926); see Wilson v. United States,
149 U. S. 60, 13 Sup. Ct. 765 (1892) ; Reagan v. United States, 157 U. S. 301,
15 Sup. Ct. 610 (1894).
11 N. Y. CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE §393, "The defendant in all cases
may testify as a witness in his own behalf but his neglect or refusal to testify
does not create any presumption against him." See People v. Friedman, 149
App. Div. 873, 134 N. Y. Supp. 153 (1912); People v. Sanders, 264 N. Y. 119,
190 N. E. 204 (1934). That prosecuting attorney may not comment on defen-
dant's failure to testify see People v. Minkowitz, 220 N. Y. 399, 115 N. E. 987
(1917); People v. Michor, 226 App. Div. 569, 235 N. Y. Supp. 386 (1929).
1845 N. Y. 213 (1871).
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"The legislature foresaw some of the evils and dangers
that might result from the passage of this act, and did what
could be done to prevent them by enacting that the neglect or
refusal of the accused to testify should not create a presump-
tion against him."
The above-quoted opinion, besides indicating the hesitation of
the court in approving the legislation then before it, expresses in
some measure the arguments of those opposed to the adoption of
the rule advocated by the Judicial Council.
The issues are, in the main, these:
(1) Will the interests of justice be served by the proposed
amendment?
(2) Will the right to comment by the prosecution on the de-
fendant's refusal to testify, virtually compel the latter to
incriminate himself, in violation of his constitutional
privilege?
(3) Will the measure deny the defendant his rights secured
under the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment to the United States Constitution?
The answer, by the sponsors of the new legislation, to the first
question is expressed by Attorney-General Bennett:
"The one who knows most about the charges with which he
is confronted is the defendant. The fact that he fails to tes-
tify in his own behalf logically warrants an inference that he
is either unable to explain the facts that seem to inculpate him
or that he has some facts bearing on his guilt that he wishes
to conceal. Similar inferences from silence or failure to call
witnesses are permissible in civil cases."
On the other hand. it is said that the defendant's desire to avail
himself of his constitutional privilege to remain mute can be predi-
cated on many other grounds than knowledge of his guilt, and that
in any case, as held in a Missouri case : 21
"Guilt is not to be presumed from the failure to disprove any
fact. The defendant is presumed innocent until the State
establishes his guilt. The burden is not on him to prove his
innocence but on the State to show it beyond a reasonable
doubt."
'State v. Snyder, 182 Mo. 462, 82 S. W. 12 (1904).
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But whether or not an inference of guilt can be properly drawn
from the defendant's silence, it is admitted that a jury, without any
instructions on the subject, is apt to draw an inference unfavorable
to the defendant where he fails to testify. It is claimed that such an
inference is natural in view of the common experience of men and
so should be allowed in a trial by jury. In State v. Ford, the court
said: 22
"* * * The failure of one charged with the commission
of a crime to deny the performance of the acts attributed to
him is logically relevant to the issue of his guilt or innocence.
At all events, no court or jury can fail to give some weight,
more or less according to the circumstances of the case, to
such conduct of the accused. It is a fact of the case which
is obvious, and no statute or ruling of the Court can prevent
the trier as a general rule from drawing inferences from that
fact."
Said the court in State v. Cleaves: 23
"The defendant, in criminal cases, is either innocent or guilty.
If innocent, he has every inducement to state the facts which
would exonerate him. * * * This declining to avail himself of
the privilege of testifying is an existent and obvious fact. * * *
The jury cannot avoid perceiving it. Why should they not
regard it as a fact of more or less weight in determining the
guilt or innocence of the accused? * * *"
In Parker v. State, the court declared: 24
"Such an inference is natural and irresistible. It will be drawn
by honest jurymen and no instructions will prevent it. Must
a court refrain from noticing that which is so plain and forcible
an indication of guilt?"
Opponents of the measure, while admitting in general the in-
evitability of the inference, find in that fact no reason for aiding the
drawing of the inference by actively bringing the attention of the
jury to the defendant's failure to testify. Their view is effectuated
in State v. Colonese, where the court held: 25
"There is nothing in the statutory provision or in our rules
of law which requires the jury to disregard the fact that the
109 Conn. 490, 146 At. 828 (1929).
'WIGNIOa, op. cit. supra note 7, §2272, par. 2; 59 Me. 298 (1871).
a61 N. J. L. 308, 39 AtI. 651 (1898).
108 Conn. 454, 143 AtI. 561 (1928). But see supra note 22.
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accused did not testify. Nor does it forbid the jury to draw
its own conclusion from this circumstance. The requirements
of law are fully met when counsel and the court have avoided
comment upon the fact that the accused has failed to take the
witness stand in his own behalf."
So great has been the fear of such inferences as might be drawn
by a jury, that one court insisted that the jury should be instructed
not even to discuss the matter between themselves.2 6
A more serious question arises with reference to the constitu-
tionality of the proposed legislation in light of the self-incrimination
clause of the New York State Constitution.27 If the accused, fearing
the effect of comment on his failure to testify, takes the stand to
prevent such comment, has he been compelled to give evidence against
himself ? We have already noted the view taken in Ruloff v. People.28
In State v. Ford,29 decided one year after the Colonese case, the Con-
necticut court said:
"It has been argued that, independent of statutory provision,
an accused is entitled to a ruling that no inference prejudicial
to him shall be drawn from his failure to testify, since other-
wise it will become practically obligatory upon him to testify,
and he will be deprived of his constitutional privilege. The
Constitutional privilege goes no further historically or logi-
cally than to prevent the employment of legal process to com-
pel an accused to incriminate himself by what he may say upon
the witness stand. He cannot be compelled to testify against
his will. The privilege of refraining from testifying, if he
so elect, does not protect him from any unfavorable inference
which may be drawn by his triers from his exercise of that
privilege. * * * Not only is the inference a natural one, but
permitting it to be drawn is not a violation of the constitu-
tional privilege. There is no actual compulsion upon the ac-
cused to testify, and when he elects not to do so, he is obvi-
ously not being compelled to give evidence against himself."
It may well be that, in light of the historical setting of the self-
incrimination clause of the common law, the constitutional protection
should be limited to the very circumstances for which it was designed,
and thus would not be violated merely because accused persons would
find it more expedient to testify than to remain silent.
IWilson v. State, 39 Tex. Cr. 365, 46 S. W. 251 (1898).
'Art. I, §6: "No person shall be subject to be twice put in jeopardy for
the same offense; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself; nor be deprived of life, liberty or property without due
process of law."
'sSupra note 20.
Supra notes 22 and 25.
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The Colorado Supreme Court held that if an inference could be
drawn against the accused from his silence the constitutional provi-
sion, that no person should be compelled to give evidence against
himself, would be abrogated.30
"For if silence is to be taken as evidence of guilt, the defen-
dant's option is of but little avail; he is practically forced to
testify, and once upon the witness stand may be required to
give the very testimony upon which the conviction shall rest."
Criticizing the resolutions of the American Bar Association and
the American Law Institute relative to comment on the defendant's
refusal to testify, one author declared: 31
"The plan is obviously unconstitutional, in the case of federal
legislation under the Constitution of the United States and in
the case of state legislation under normal state constitutions,
32
if the effect of such a provision is to force the accused to take
the stand or to suffer a real detriment if he does not do so.
And, on the other hand, if the jury is to be aided in drawing
a natural inference from the silence of the defendant it is
obviously necessary to provide safeguards to insure that only
a natural inference will be drawn. For example, * * * a man
who is entirely innocent of the crime charged, may fear that
discreditive cross-examination would bring out evidence con-
cerning another offense which could not be considered by the
jury if he did not take the stand, and which might so injure
him in the eyes of the jury as to bring about his conviction."
Whether or not the proposed amendment would violate the Four-
teenth Amendment of the United States Constitution, guaranteeing
that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without
due process of law, is a question not satisfactorily answered by the
case of Twining v. New Jersey.33 The United States Supreme Court
did decide in that case that the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment does not render unconstitutional the instruction of a state
court that the jury might make such inferences as it finds reasonable
from the defendant's failure to take the witness stand, declaring that
protection from compulsory self-incrimination is not an essential ele-
ment of due process, and that it is not one of the privileges or im-
munities of national citizenship guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment against abridgement by the states.
Petite v. People, 8 Colo. 518, 9 Pac. 622 (1895).
Cited supra notes 4 and 15.
Such as the N. Y. CoNsT., cited supra note 27.
211 U. S. 78, 29 Sup. Ct. 14 (1908).
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But the court added: 34
"We have assumed only for the purpose of discussion that
what was done in the case at bar was an infringement of the
privilege against self-incrimination. We do not intend, how-
ever, to lend any countenance to that assumption. The courts
of New Jersey, in adopting the rule of law complained of
here, have deemed it consistent with the privilege and not a
denial of it." 35
Since New Jersey is without a self-incrimination clause in its
constitution, it cannot be said that the Twining case is authority for
the proposition that in a state with a constitution protecting the ac-
cused from being compelled to testify, a statute allowing the prosecu-
tion to comment on the accused's failure to testify does not violate
the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
It is to be noted that the Supreme Court did not urge that com-
ment on the accused's silence would tend to compel defendants to
take the stand in violation of the compulsory self-incrimination pro-
tection afforded by the common law in New Jersey, 36 but acknowl-
edged the decision of the New Jersey courts that comment was com-
patible with the defendant's right. But comment in the New Jersey
courts is restricted to occasions when there is a "duty" upon the de-
fendant to speak, and he refuses.
"It is well-settled that evidence may be admitted against an
accused establishing the fact that declarations as charges of
his guilt were made to him, and that he made no reply, pro-
vided that the occasion was such that a reply from him might
be properly expected. * * * When the accused is upon trial
and the evidence tends to establish facts which if true would
be conclusive of his guilt of the charge against him and he
can disprove them by his own oath as a witness if the facts
be not true, then his silence would justify a strong inference
that he could not deny the charges." 37
To recapitulate: The self-incrimination clause of the consti-
tution was adopted from the common law, where it was developed
under circumstances quite unlike modern conditions. It was de-
signed to stop the forcing of incriminating evidence from the mouth
of the accused, and did so by disqualifying him as a witness. 38
3'Id. at 114.
Read dissenting opinion by Justice Harlan, ibid.
'See cases cited supra note 5. By statute the defendant is qualified to
testify. N. J. Laws of 1898, c. 237, §57.
Parker v. State, supra note 5.
See supra notes 6, 7 and 8.
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Today there is no such pressure upon one accused of crime.
A defendant has been made a competent witness in his own behalf.39
HIe may speak, and when he can refute the charges brought against
him by so doing, yet fails to testify, the inference of guilt arises. To
permit comment on such failure to forward an explanation is to
recognize and validate an existing fact.
If the amendment to the New York Code of Criminal Procedure
proposed by the Judicial Council is so worded as to allow the prose-
cuting attorney to comment on the defendant's failure to testify
only when the evidence against the accused is such that, were he
innocent, he could refute the charges against him, then it may well
be considered constitutional, just and expedient. But it must be
borne in mind that until the prosecution has made out a case against
the defendant calling for a reply other than that furnished by his
witnesses, till then his silence cannot be considered an indication of
guilt, and no comment thereupon should be permitted.
G. ROBERT ELLEGAARD.
THE EFFECT OF THE DEPRESSION ON THE DUTIES AND LIABILITIES
OF THE TRUSTEE IN RELATION TO TRUST FUND INVESMENTS.
The trustee who has acted prudently, with reasonable diligence,
and in good faith will not be held liable for trust fund losses caused
by the depression. "Executors I and trustees cannot be watchers of
the tape, nor gamblers in stocks," declared Surrogate Slater in In re
Winburn.2 "There is no need for executors to jettison worthwhile
stock during a financial panic." The Winburn. case further indicates
that if "worthwhile" or "seasoned" securities decline because of a
general business depression, the trustee has done all that a reasonable
man can do, and is not to be held liable for any loss. 3 Whether the
security is "seasoned" or not is determined through the media of
several tests: "What has been the history of the companies during
a period of years? Have they paid fair dividends regularly? Have
they a proper capital structure? Are they wisely officered? Has a
successful business continued over a period of time? Have they
Supra note 19.
1Both the executor's and trustee's investment duties and liabilities have
been treated alike. In re Kent's Estate, 146 Misc. 155, 159, 261 N. Y. Supp.
698 (1932).
'140 Misc. 18, 22, 249 N. Y. Supp. 758, 763 (1931) (Executor consulted
Moody's Book of Stock Ratings).
'it re Winburn, supra note 2; see Matter of Thompson, 41 Misc.
420, 84 N. Y. Supp. 1111 (1903).
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